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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between international war crimes 
tribunals and peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. The aim of the present study 
was to examine how the role and function of international tribunals has changed since 
the establishment of the Nuremberg tribunal in the early years after World War II. 
Due to the evolving nature of international law and the international criminal legal 
system, international tribunals have become increasingly recognized as an integral 
component of peacebuilding processes in the aftermath of conflict. As the first 
international tribunal mandated to restore international peace and security, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) set a new 
precedent for international tribunals. Beginning with its establishment, there appeared 
to be a new trend of using international judicial mechanisms to promote peace and 
reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict. One important element of change was the 
increased tendency of international tribunals to engage in public outreach and help 
build the capacity of national justice sector institutions. As the first international 
tribunal to succeed the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and the first UN tribunal of its 
kind, the ICTY has shown the extent to which international tribunals facilitate societal 
reconciliation is, and will be, understood within the context of the legacies they leave 
behind. Institutions such as the ICTY will not be judged solely on the merits of the 
ideals on which they were established, but instead on their concrete successes in the 
domestic arena and their ability to fortify domestic judicial capacity.  
Keywords: Rule of Law, Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, Outreach, 
International Tribunals, Transitional Justice, and Capacity-Building 
  
	  	  
LaVilla 3 
Chapter 1: International War Crimes Tribunals: An Introduction 
 
In 1992, conflict engulfed the multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH). It became the site of deadly warfare and the target of ethnic 
cleansing.1 From 1992-95, grave crimes against humanity, violations of human rights, 
and genocide were committed in BiH.2 The conflict claimed the lives of an estimated 
100,000 people and forced another two million people, more than half the republic’s 
population, to flee their homes.3 On May 25, 1993, United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolution 827 established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) to bring to justice those persons responsible for these serious 
violations of international humanitarian law in the region of the former Yugoslavia 
since 1991.4  
The ICTY was the first international tribunal to succeed the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals established in the aftermath of World War II. As the “genesis of 
international criminal law and enforcement” the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals 
provided the foundation for the creation of the ICTY in 1993 and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.5 Due to the evolution of international 
law and the international criminal legal system, international tribunals have become 
increasingly recognized as an integral component of peacebuilding in post-conflict 
societies. As the first international tribunal mandated to restore international peace 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The systemic elimination of one ethnic or religious group by another ethnic or 
religious group or groups from a region or society as by forced emigration, 
deportation, or genocide.   
2 Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca: 
Cornell University, 2009), 123. 
3 “The Conflicts,” ICTY, n.d., http://www.icty.org/sid/322. 
4 Lara J. Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 3. 
5 Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability After 
War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 18. 
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and security, the ICTY set a new precedent for international tribunals. Beginning with 
its establishment, there appeared to be a new emphasis on using international judicial 
mechanisms to promote peace and reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict. One 
important element of change was the increased tendency of international tribunals to 
engage in public outreach and help build the capacity of national justice sector 
institutions. In this regard, promotion of the rule of law, institution building, and 
reconciliation has evolved out of the ICTY’s work.  
Following the end of WWII and the establishment of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals, international humanitarian and human rights law expanded. 
Important conventions were agreed upon including the UN Genocide Convention of 
1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 1977.6 These developments in international law 
laid the foundation for transitional justice, a set of “judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms aimed at dealing with the legacy of large-scale abuses of human rights 
and/or violations of international humanitarian law.”7 During the late 1980s and early 
1990s transitional justice emerged in response to political events taking place in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe focusing more on abuses of human rights.8 Following 
the end of the Cold War in 1991, the intervention of outside actors in situations, 
previously “deemed beyond the purview of an outside entity,” significantly 
increased.9 Peace operations became more commonplace and their scope expanded, in 
some instances undertaking projects to build or re-build institutions in post-conflict or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid., 23. 
7 Ibid., 3. 
8 Aryeh Neier, The International Human Rights Movement: A History (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 259. 
9 Kerr and Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability After War, 1. 
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failing states.10 In 1993, the establishment of the ICTY appeared to “signal the advent 
of a developing norm of ‘international judicial intervention’, based on the 
understanding that justice was a non-negotiable element of sustainable peace-
building.”11 As international justice has been recognized as “part and parcel of a 
broader peacebuilding process,” courts such as the Yugoslav tribunal have “begun to 
embrace the idea that justice is not only a tool to fill justice gaps at the domestic level, 
but an instrument to strengthen domestic justice efforts.”12  In this regard, not only did 
the ICTY secure accountability for past abuses, it made a direct contribution to 
increasing the capacity of the region’s national courts and informing the local 
communities of the Tribunal’s purpose and work in an effort to facilitate 
reconciliation in the region.13 
The aim of the present study is to examine this change in the role and function 
of international war crimes tribunals since the early years after WWII. In order to 
understand this new emphasis on public outreach and domestic rule of law capacity 
building, we can examine the similarities and differences between the ITCY and 
Nuremburg and how they compare in origin, mandate and execution. Prior to the 
1990s, international tribunals did not fall into the category of what was 
conventionally understood as a tool for peacebuilding. For the sake of clarity, I refer 
to peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 30. 
12 Carsten Stahn, “The Future of International Criminal Justice” (presented at the 
Opening of the Academic Year, Den Haag, Leiden University, 2009), 9, 
http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/opening-future-of-international-criminal-justice-
pdf.pdf. 
13 For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on the role and activities of the 
Nuremberg tribunal and the ICTY.  
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strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”14 This thesis 
suggests that the ICTY has played a role in peacebuilding in the region of the former 
Yugoslavia in the sense that it made a direct contribution to strengthening the rule of 
law in the region.  
As of July 1, 2013, the ICTY has transferred jurisdiction over its cases to a 
Residual Mechanism. This research arrives at a moment when the ICTY’s legacy and 
role in transitional justice processes is under considerable scrutiny and calls attention 
to the legacy of the ICTY.15 The ICTY’s overture into peacebuilding is profound. It 
has major implications for reconciliation on the ground and the role that future 
international tribunals play in the wake of conflict. Just as the ICTY was predicated 
on the Nuremberg principles, the ICTY now provides an important model for future 
judicial intervention in the aftermath of conflict. Although it has received a great deal 
of criticism, the ICTY gave impetus to the formation of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), the first permanent court of its kind.16 The creation of the ICC marked 
an important step towards global accountability for all, building on the experience of 
the ICTY and a new legal precedent for universal jurisdiction. Providing a number of 
‘lessons learned’ regarding public outreach and domestic rule of law capacity 
building, the ICTY continues to be instrumental in the emergence of internationalized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc 
A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) [hereinafter An Agenda for Peace]. 
15 Nerma Jelacic, Suzana Szabo, and Slavica Kosca-Vrlazic, eds., “Legacy of the 
ICTY in the Former Yugoslavia Conference Proceedings Sarajevo, 6 November 
2012; Zagreb 8 November 2012,” trans. Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 
(BIRN) BiH (ICTY Outreach Programme, 2013), 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/conferences_pub/naslijedje_mksj_sa-zg_en.pdf. 
16 Kerr and Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability After War, 31. 
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and hybrid criminal courts and tribunals, which aim to achieve an even greater degree 
of coordination and/or integration with domestic courts.17  
Understanding how the role and function of international tribunals regarding 
peacebuilding has changed regarding peacebuilding is the first step in understanding 
why this change has occurred. Furthermore, understanding this change informs the 
notion of how transitional justice has evolved and will continue to evolve over time. 
The ICTY has shown that the extent to which international judicial institutions 
facilitate societal reconciliation is, and will be, understood within the context of the 
legacies they leave behind. Institutions such as the ICTY will not be judged solely on 
the merits of the ideals that they were established on, but instead on their concrete 
successes in the domestic arena and their ability to fortify domestic judicial capacity. 
Historical Context 
Prior to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito held tight 
control over the ethnic, religious and nationalist groups under the umbrella of a 
‘greater Yugoslavia.’ After Tito’s death, relations between the six former Yugoslav 
republics deteriorated. Politicians began to exploit nationalist rhetoric, pitting Serbs, 
Croats, and Bosniaks against one another. Prior to the breakup, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(BiH) was an ethnically mixed state. Its three constituent peoples18 lived together in 
peace. However, on March 3, 1992, BiH’s declaration of independence from the 
former Yugoslavia elicited a violent response from the Bosnian Serbs. National 
sentiments mobilized the Bosnian Serbs and Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to 
partition BiH along ethnic lines, with the ultimate goal of creating a “Greater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid., 81. 
18 Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.  
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Serbia.”19 By means of armed resistance, they waged war against the Bosnian Croats 
and Bosnia Muslims. The war in BiH continued for three years, with two of the 
greatest atrocities being the years-long siege of Sarajevo that began in 1992 and the 
genocide at Srebrenica in 1995, which claimed the lives of over 8,000 Bosnian 
Muslim men and boys.20 Between 1992-95, failed UN peacekeeping efforts exposed 
the “impotence and sterility of a system of world order…that was founded, in an 
attempt to bind the world legally to preventing future aggressions.”21 Although the 
U.S. and European Community formally recognized the state of BiH in the spring of 
1992 and the UNSC established the ICTY in 1993, the war prevailed resulting in 
extreme casualties.22   
The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) ended the war in late 1995 and separated 
the republic into two entities, the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat Federation of 
BiH, and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska (RS). In addition to separating these two 
entities and establishing a political, legal, and military framework in the country, the 
DPA “institutionalized international expectations for transitional justice in Bosnia.”23 
It required the two Bosnian entities to fully cooperate with the ICTY regarding “the 
investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international 
humanitarian law” in the region.24 However, even though the DPA required states to 
cooperate with the Tribunal, the ICTY struggled in securing state cooperation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Lara J. Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 1. 
20 Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1. 
21 David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1995), 21. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, 126. 
24 “Article IX of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina,” Office of the High Representative, December 14, 1995, 
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379. 
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throughout the course of its mandate.25 As an international body of law, lacking 
authority over the area in which it had jurisdiction, the ICTY was reliant on state 
cooperation in several ways. It grappled with moving states “complicit in atrocities to 
cooperate in the prosecution of suspects of their own political, national, or ethnic 
group.”26 For years, the ICTY’s ability to carry out investigations was inhibited by 
states’ lack of inclination to turn over high-level suspects to the tribunal and assist in 
obtaining evidence, and locating and interviewing witnesses. 27  Despite these 
challenges, the ICTY “laid the foundation for what is now the accepted norm for 
conflict resolution and post-conflict development across the globe, specifically that 
leaders suspected of mass crimes will face justice.”28 
At the time of the Tribunal’s establishment, national judiciaries were not 
willing or able to prosecute war crimes.29 The legitimacy of domestic war crimes 
trials in postwar BiH were further complicated by the complex constitutional 
framework established by the Dayton agreement in 1995. Due to the prevailing 
influence of nationalists in the region, the professionalism of individuals working in 
the domestic courts was compromised, causing the fair trial of cases to be 
undermined.30 In 2002, the ICTY adopted a completion strategy in anticipation of its 
closing and the need to transfer cases to local judiciaries in the region of the former 
Yugoslavia. In 2005, in response to the shortcomings of the domestic courts in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans (Cambridge, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 45. 
26 Ibid., xi. 
27 Ibid., 4. 
28 “About the ICTY,” accessed March 23, 2014, 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY. 
29 Diane Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in 
Bosnia (New York, NY: Open Society Institute, 2010), 11, accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/that-someone-guilty-
20100708.pdf. 
30 Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, 140. 
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Bosnia, the ICTY in collaboration with the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR) 31  established a War Crimes Chamber (WCC) in the Court of BiH. 32 
Additionally, as a component of the ICTY’s completion strategy, the Tribunal aided 
the development of local judicial capacity in collaboration with other international 
organizations on the ground.33 
Literature Review 
Approaches to securing accountability for genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity are continually evolving. A large and growing body of literature has 
addressed this evolution of international criminal justice and the emergence of 
transitional justice. A number of different scholars have examined the relationship 
between peace and justice, new norms in peace operations, and the integration and 
complementarity of approaches to peacebuilding processes. Although this literature 
has addressed how the relationship between peace and justice has developed and 
examined the role and expectation of international war crimes tribunals in post-
conflict societies, there is a limited body of scholarship on exactly how the role and 
function of international tribunals has changed since the early years after WWII. 
Examining this new aspect of peacebuilding that has emerged out of the ICTY’s work 
further informs the notion of how transitional justice changes over time.  
Since its establishment the ICTY has become a “global paradigm,” informing 
the work of both national and international courts.34 Many of the cases that the ICTY 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an ad hoc international 
organization tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that the democratic 
progression of Bosnia-Herzegovina is successful, peaceful, and complies with all 
aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreement. For more information on the OHR, see: 
http://www.ohr.int/ 
32 Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, 142. 
33 Nettelfield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 234. 
34 Ibid. 
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tried dealt with some of the most horrendous crimes committed since WWII.35 In 
order to understand the new role that the ICTY has assumed we must recall the 
conditions under which it was established and its original goals. As an ad hoc 
institution, established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the ICTY’s life span 
was directly linked to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the region of the 
former Yugoslavia.36 Thus, some scholars argue that the strategy devised for the 
Tribunal’s completion was a response to necessity.37 Because of its nature as a UN 
institution, the ICTY was the first international tribunal to rely on and struggle with 
state cooperation.38 Victor Peskin argues that, “the foundation for just societies 
depends in no small part on whether tribunals can overcome state obstruction and 
prosecute all sides of a conflict equitably, thereby arriving at a comprehensive truth 
about what happened and who bears responsibility.”39 He argues that the UN would 
be unable to fulfill its mission to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes and reconcile 
war-torn societies without state cooperation. Thus, the problem of state cooperation 
may have hindered the ICTY from having its intended effect on the region, causing it 
in turn to adopt new strategies for fulfilling its mandate.  
In this regard, the challenges the ICTY faced throughout the course of its 
mandate required “new creativity.”40 It was forced to develop new strategies to 
overcome lack of state-cooperation, as well as address the limitations of the Tribunal, 
as an ad hoc institution, to deal with a backlog of cases within the constraints of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid., 56. 
36 Fausto Pocar, “Completion or Continuation Strategy?: Appraising Problems and 
Possible Developments in Building the Legacy of the ICTY,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 6, no. 4 (September 1, 2008): 657, doi:10.1093/jicj/mqn043. 
37 Stahn, “The Future of International Criminal Justice,” 9; Pocar, “Completion or 
Continuation Strategy?: Appraising Problems and Possible Developments in Building 
the Legacy of the ICTY,” 657. 
38 Kerr and Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability After War, 31. 
39 Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans, 246. 
40 Stahn, “The Future of International Criminal Justice,” 10. 
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mandate.41 Specifically, a decline in the international community’s interest in the 
region encouraged the Tribunal to propose a “creative and courageous way” of 
closing down.42 For this reason, Fausto Pocar argues that the ICTY’s Completion 
Strategy, which includes increased outreach and capacity building efforts, is much 
more than a strategy to wind down the Tribunals’ trials and court proceedings. 
Instead, it is “aimed at restoring the original idea of the UNSC when it established the 
ICTY, that is, that the Tribunal would have primacy for a short period because of the 
inability of the local judiciaries to deliver justice and ensure a future of peace to the 
region.”43 Thus, if we consider the adoption of this strategy in its entirety “it is not so 
much a strategy to ‘complete’ the work of the ICTY as it is a strategy designed to 
allow continuation by local actors of those activities that were initially ‘kicked off'’ 
by the ICTY under the mandate of the Security Council.”44 
The relationship between law and politics is complex, and calls into question 
the productiveness of implementing international mechanisms of transitional justice.45  
Jelena Subotic argues that “transitional justice is quickly becoming an international 
norm, a standard of proper state behavior…yet the way this new international norm 
has played itself out in real politics of countries that have adopted it has departed 
greatly from international expectations.”46 The discrepancy between international 
expectations of international criminal courts and the reality of how they play out on 
the ground results in negative attitudes and perceptions of transitional justice 
mechanisms. In turn, Subotic questions what the appropriate political response to 
mass atrocities is today. She contends that because transitional justice mechanisms, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid., 9. 
42 Pocar, “Completion or Continuation Strategy?,” 657. 
43 Ibid., 665. 
44 Ibid., 661.  
45 Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, 189. 
46 Ibid., p. 5. 
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such as war crimes trials and truth commissions, have been recognized as a necessary 
and desirable component of post-conflict reconstruction, there is an expectation that 
states will address violent conflict through international judicial institutions, as 
opposed to granting amnesties for war crimes. Subotic finds this expectation 
problematic due to the fact that there is a tendency for state actors to ‘hijack’ various 
methods of transitional justice for local political strategies. In addressing the major 
problem of how to deal with atrocities of the past, and the perpetrators of those 
atrocities, Subotic argues that there should be a stronger focus on the social 
transformation and reconciliation of post-conflict societies.47 
In order to understand this division between international and national 
expectations of transitional justice, the relative benefits and drawbacks of the range of 
possible mechanisms must be better understood. Through an examination of various 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms for dealing with issues of justice and 
accountability in post-conflict societies, Kerr and Mobekk conclude that “while there 
is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to the difficult and complex question of how to deal 
with past abuses, lessons from past and current endeavors can help provide a 
framework through which we might be able to better assess the best possible solution 
for a given situation.”48 Examining the contexts in which the establishment of the 
Nuremberg tribunal and the ICTY were pursued is one of the most important 
considerations. In fragile post-conflict settings advancing justice, peace, and 
reconciliation is a complex task. It requires careful planning and a clear understanding 
of the specific history and background to the conflict and the actors involved. 49 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans. 
48 Kerr and Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability After War, 3. 
49 Ibid., 10–11. 
	  	  
LaVilla 14 
Understanding the nature of the conflict is therefore crucial if we are to be able to 
draw sensible distinctions between the roles and activities of these two tribunals.  
According to Kerr and Mobekk, the transitional justice process is directly 
affected by the existence of a peace agreement, financial capabilities, existing 
infrastructure and local capacity in the post-conflict setting, political will, and the 
degree to which the international community is involved.50 In this regard, examining 
the historical context, principal justifications for and ultimate aims of the Nuremberg 
tribunal and the ICTY is the first step in understanding how trends in transitional 
justice change over time. Understanding the similarities and differences between 
these two major international tribunals can provide insight into the evolution of the 
role and function of international tribunals regarding peacebuilding since the early 
post-WWII period.   
Over the past twenty years, transitional justice has become a “normalized and 
globalized form of intervention following civil war and political repression.”51 
Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf argue that, along with other transitional justice 
mechanisms, war crimes prosecutions have put into practice “a liberal vision of 
history as progress, a redemptive model in which the harms of the past may be 
repaired in order to produce a future characterized by the non-reoccurrence of 
violence, the rule of law, and a culture of human rights.”52 Within the practice of this 
liberal vision, transitional justice has recently “undergone a shift toward the local.”53 
As a result, “since the turn of the millennium, the field of transitional justice has been 
increasingly challenged by the people it is designed to serve: survivors of mass 	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violence.”54 Moreover, “this latest phase of transitional justice is marked not only by 
a fasciation with locality, but also a return to Nuremberg’s international norms against 
impunity and a UN prohibition against granting amnesties for war crimes.”55 
With the emergence of transitional justice came subsequent developments in 
the role of international criminal tribunals.56 It became widely recognized that a key 
aspect in reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict is the development of the rule of 
law. In turn, international criminal processes began to coalesce with domestic rule of 
law reform.57 Padraig McAuliffe argues that the inherent differences in the fields’ 
varying notions and conceptualizations of the rule of law have contributed to the 
divergence in approaches to the practice of international criminal justice. He contends 
that new developments in transitional justice are the by-product of legal and human 
rights theory. He argues that: 
With the consolidation of transitional justice came an accelerated process of 
contagion learning, where policy-makers in one context appropriated the 
knowledge and methodologies accumulated in previous transitions. As 
transitional justice enters a ‘do everything, engage everyone’ era, a restorative 
paradigm of justice concerned with the individual, the family and the local 
community has shared parity with more status-legalist approaches.58 
For this reason, he contends that criticisms of the operation of ad hoc tribunals has led 
to an approach to transitional justice in which “victims emerged in transitional 
criminal trials from their earlier instrumentalization to become one of the main 
constituencies of prosecution, consultation became the paramount virtue of 	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58 Ibid., 3. 
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accountability planning, and outreach has become imperative” to the success of 
international tribunals.59 
Traditionally, the primary role of criminal proceedings is to prosecute 
individuals for violations of the law. Yasmin Naqvi explains that, “from a common 
law perspective, [the criminal process] is not so much about finding the truth than as 
it is offering evidence that proves guilt or innocence…the ‘legal truth’ is merely a by-
product of a dispute settlement mechanism.”60 However, in the case of international 
criminal courts, this by-product has “taken on a new dimension.”61 Naqvi explains 
that, “the right to truth has emerged as a legal concept at the national, regional and 
international levels, and relates to the obligation of the state to provide information to 
victims or to their families or even to society as a whole about the circumstances 
surrounding serious violations of human rights.”62 She accredits the new dimension of 
this legal concept to the unique objectives of international criminal law. International 
criminal courts are inherently dispute settlement mechanisms; however, the principal 
aims of their founders have redefined the traditional role of the criminal process. 
When taken together, acknowledgement of a legal right to truth in international war 
crimes tribunals “would intermesh strategically with the broader objectives of 
international criminal law, arguably including those of restoring and maintaining 
peace.”63 Thus, the objectives of international criminal courts have been redefined 
due to the emergence of the legal concept of the right to truth. It is no longer enough 
to examine the work of international tribunals in the courtroom. It is important to 
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understand how their work plays out on the ground and affects the local communities 
for which they dispense justice.  
Growing debates about the effectiveness of international criminal tribunals 
have caused scholars and practitioners to look to alternative responses to mass 
atrocities. For some time effectiveness was narrowly defined as international impact. 
Carsten Stahn argues that there has been a paradigm shift in international justice. 
International judicial institutions are no longer judged on their performance, but on 
their ability to contribute to problem solving.64 Stahn contends that, “the effects of 
justice cannot be measured only by what is actually going on in the courtroom, but by 
their impact internationally and domestically.”65 Moreover, he argues that justice is 
“no longer a one-way street—it is a dialogue among international institutions and 
jurisdictions and, most of all, a dialogue with domestic jurisdictions.”66 For this 
reason, an analysis of the realistic achievements of international justice requires an 
understanding of how the relationship between international tribunals and 
peacebuilding has evolved over time. 
Since the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR new initiatives to combat 
impunity have been “welcomed as potentially offering advantages over other 
approaches.”67 These initiatives have come in a multiplicity of forms from other 
judicial mechanisms for accountability such as the ICC, amnesties, truth 
commissions, and traditional informal justice mechanisms. According to Kerr and 
Mobekk, although there is still contention over “the potentially destabilizing impacts 
of transitional justice, and about sequencing of peace and justice processes,” the 
debate surrounding the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms “has 	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largely shifted from whether to pursue some form of transitional justice, to what form 
it should take, what the degree of international involvement should be and who should 
be engaged.”68 This thesis suggests that the ICTY’s emphasis on public outreach and 
domestic rule of law capacity building has redefined the degree to which international 
tribunals should be engaged in peacebuilding efforts on the ground.  
Finally, the focus that has been placed by the international human rights 
movement over the last quarter century on securing accountability for “grave abuses” 
has, according to Aryeh Neier, led to the emergence of truth commissions, increased 
use of the principle of universal jurisdiction, and development of international 
criminal tribunals.69 The movement’s concern with accountability first came into 
focus in 1983 on account of disappearances in Argentina.70 For roughly a decade, 
“truth commissions were the preferred means of securing accountability.”71 However, 
when faced with holding perpetrators of “crimes committed in connection with 
‘ethnic cleansing’” accountable, there was a call for prosecutions and criminal 
sanctions. 72  In both regards, securing a reduction of crime underscores the 
movement’s promotion of accountability. Neier submits,  “it will take a good many 
years before it is possible to make an assessment of whether the mechanisms for 
promoting accountability that are now in place are also achieving the deterrent 
purpose.” 73 In order to begin to make such an assessment, it is valuable to understand 
how Nuremberg, the first international tribunal mandated to establish individual 
accountability for war crimes committed during WWII, differs from its immediate 
successor, the ICTY. In order to understand the full potential and capacity of an 	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international war crimes tribunal, such as the ICTY, we need to critically analyze its 
role and function in relation to that of its predecessor. 
Methodology 
The research for this thesis is based on a compilation of primary and 
secondary sources. Qualitative research methods were also employed in the form of 
three semi-structured interviews and an observation of a conference entitled “Legacy 
of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia” held in Sarajevo on November 6, 2012. The 
target populations for my data collection were individuals working for the ICTY and 
in the media sector in Sarajevo, BiH. Interviewees included two representatives of the 
ICTY, one in Sarajevo and one in The Hague, and one representative of the Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN). Additionally, data was gathered and 
analyzed from the “Legacy of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia” conference. The 
conference had four panel discussions and participants were comprised of a variety of 
stakeholders including national judiciaries, victims, local NGOs, politicians, 
journalists, and transitional justice experts. A number of primary sources, including 
UN Resolutions, ICTY annual reports and factsheets, newspaper articles, and the 
Nuremberg Charter and ICTY Statute were examined. Additionally a number of 
secondary sources, on topics including international justice, the Nuremberg tribunal, 
and the ICTY were utilized in order to better understand the historical context and 
work of the two tribunals. 
Chapter Organization 
This thesis has four chapters including this introduction. The following 
chapter will compare and contrast the roles and activities of the Nuremberg tribunal 
and the ICTY. It will examine the factual circumstances surrounding the 
establishment of both tribunals, the principal aims of their founders, their legal basis, 
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and their criminal and territorial jurisdiction. By examining how these two 
international tribunals were both similar and different we can see a change in the role 
and function international tribunals have played in post-conflict societies since the 
early post-war years of WWII.  
The third chapter will provide an in-depth examination of the ICTY’s role and 
activities in the region of the former Yugoslavia. It will discuss some specific ways in 
which the ICTY engaged in conducting public outreach and strengthening the rule of 
law in the region, specifically in BiH. The relationship between the Nuremberg 
tribunal and the ICTY and the regions for which they dispensed justice is by far the 
greatest difference between the two tribunals. Illustrating the ICTY’s overture into 
peace-building through public outreach and domestic rule of law capacity building 
efforts requires a lengthy examination of the specific series of programs and measures 
implemented by the Tribunal.  
The fourth chapter will examine possible explanations for the ICTY’s overture 
into peacebuilding. It will discuss some of the main challenges the ICTY faced in 
completing its mandate. Additionally, it will discuss policy implications of this new 
relationship between the ICTY and the local communities for which it distributed 
justice. I will suggest that since the end of the Cold War, and the establishment of the 
ICTY, the success of international tribunals has been redefined within the context of 
the impact they leave on domestic judicial systems. For this reason, over the course of 
its mandate, it has become apparent that the ability of the ICTY to contribute to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace in the former Yugoslavia depends on the impact 
and legacy it leaves on the local level. I will suggest that it is no longer enough for ad 
hoc tribunals such as the ICTY to merely exist and fulfill their basic mandates to 
distribute justice. The real success of international justice relies on these institutions’ 
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ability to transfer responsibility from the international community to the local 
community and establish domestic judiciaries that can carry on their missions and 
make them domestic initiatives. 
Chapter Conclusion 
The aim of this research is to understand how the ICTY differs from its 
predecessor, the Nuremberg tribunal in order to provide a framework for future 
research into the reasons for the ICTY’s overture into peacebuilding through public 
outreach and domestic rule of law capacity building efforts. This research informs the 
notion of the changing role of transitional justice mechanisms, specifically 
international tribunals, in post-conflict societies. It will help determine the extent to 
which the role of international tribunals has changed since the early post-war years of 
WWII, so that we can begin to understand if and in what ways transitional justice 
mechanisms can continue to aid in the peacebuilding process in the aftermath of 
conflict. More broadly, it will help determine the overall viability of transitional 
justice mechanisms in promoting peace and security in war-torn societies. 
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Chapter 2: Comparing the Nuremberg tribunal and the ICTY 
 
The Nuremberg tribunal, which was formally established in the immediate 
aftermath of WWII, revolutionized the way people around the world think about 
accountability for international war crimes. Despite questions raised about the 
legitimacy of the Nuremberg trials, the tribunal marked a significant step forward in 
the development and codification of international law. 74 Nuremberg’s findings led 
directly to the codification of the UN Genocide Convention of 1948, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
Additional Protocols of 1977.75 The legacy of Nuremberg provided the foundation for 
the establishment of the ICTY in 1993, and its sister tribunal the ICTR in 1994.76 
These International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs) have further expanded the role and 
function international law and international tribunals play in societies devastated by 
conflict.  
The ICTY specifically, initiated a new way of thinking about the relationship 
between international and national justice institutions in war torn societies. 
Nuremberg and the ICTY were both established to hold individual perpetrators 
accountable for their actions under international law and demonstrate that leaders of 
mass crimes will face justice. They established indisputable historical records in an 
effort to combat denial and maintain peace. While the ICTY marked a “return to 
Nuremberg’s international norms against impunity,” its role and function differed 
greatly from that of the Nuremberg tribunal.77 This chapter provides an in-depth 
examination of the similarities and differences between the two tribunals with respect 
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to their modes of establishment, legal basis, political aims, and criminal and territorial 
jurisdiction. It looks at the specific circumstances that led to the establishment of each 
tribunal and their founders’ motivation and goals in prosecuting war criminals under 
international law. Additionally, it examines each tribunal’s criminal and territorial 
jurisdiction in order to understand their different roles and functions in distinct post-
conflict situations.   
The International Tribunals’ Modes of Establishment 
Prosecutions of war crimes on the international level were rare prior to the 
establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials “marked a watershed in international law,” specifically with regards to 
enforcement.78 They demonstrated that securing individual accountability for war 
crimes was a feasible aim.79 The prosecution of Peter von Hagenbach80 in 1474 is the 
earliest recorded trial in an international court for violations of the laws of God and 
humanity, which would be classified today as war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.81 The next notable attempt to prosecute individuals under international law 
took place at the end of World War I.82 However, in the aftermath of the war the 
“prospect of pursuing international justice through judicial means…was dead” 
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because Germany refused to hand over its alleged perpetrators and the Allies were not 
willing to use force.83 
The possibility of pursing international justice was “radically different” at the 
end of WWII.84 At the end of the war, the Allies—the United States (US), the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain (UK), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and 
France—had achieved a total victory, the German government had collapsed, and the 
Allies were in occupation of the country. The Allies were holding a number of 
German leaders captive and needed to make a choice as to what to do with them.85 
They could have freed them without a trial; however, as explained by US 
Representative and Chief of Counsel to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at 
Nuremberg, Robert H. Jackson “to free them without a trial would mock the dead and 
make cynics of the living.” 86  Thus, an appropriate plan for prosecution was 
necessary.87 
In December 1942, the Allied leaders of the US, UK, and the Soviet Union 
“issued the first joint declaration officially noting the mass murder of European Jewry 
and resolving to prosecute those responsible for violence against civilian 
populations.”88 In October 1943, these three leaders—U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin—
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met and discussed their plans for the trial and punishment of Nazi war criminals.89 
The British government favored summary execution, arguing that Nazi leaders did not 
deserve a fair trial. However, the U.S. was adamant that the four Allied nations—the 
US, UK, the Soviet Union, and France—needed to demonstrate the democratic notion 
of justice in the punishment of Nazi leaders.90 In their Declaration of German 
Atrocities released on November 1, 1943, the three Allied powers declared that “at the 
time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in 
Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party” deemed 
responsible for “atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions” would be 
sent back to the countries in which the crimes had occurred and be judged and 
punished according to the laws of those nations.91 The “German criminals whose 
offenses [had] no particular geographical localization” would be “punished by joint 
decision of the governments of the Allies.”92 On August 8, 1945, after the war’s 
conclusion, the Governments of the Allies (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Signatories’) 
signed the London Charter, which officially established the Nuremberg tribunal to 
prosecute these major war criminals.93 While the prospect of prosecuting the principal 
German leaders was discussed prior to the end of the war, the Nuremberg tribunal 
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was not formally established until after Victory in Europe Day (generally known as 
VE Day).94 
The situation at the time of the ICTY’s establishment was fundamentally 
different. In May 1993, the UN established the ICTY under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, while conflict was still turbulent in the former Yugoslavia.95 The violent 
breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s spurred the international community into action.96 
The UN recognized the severity of the situation, and urged parties to the conflict to 
comply with international law as early as September 1991.97 In October 1992, the UN 
expressed concern over “widespread violations of international humanitarian law,” 
including reports of mass killings and the practice of “ethnic cleansing” in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, specifically Bosnia and Herzegovina.98 These 
reports moved the UN to call on Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to establish 
a Commission of Experts that could provide conclusions on these accounts of abuses 
in the region. 99 The findings of the Commission, which included evidence of grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, led the UN Security Council (UNSC) to reaffirm its “grave alarm” 
at reports of widespread abuses in the former Yugoslavia, and determine that the 
situation constituted a “threat to international peace and security.”100 In 1993, the 
Security Council decided that in the particular circumstances of the former 
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Yugoslavia the establishment of an international tribunal would enable it to put an 
end to such crimes, bring to justice those persons responsible for committing crimes, 
and contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.101 On May 25, 1993, the 
UNSC passed Resolution 827 formally establishing the ICTY for the “prosecution of 
persons responsible for committing serious violations of international humanitarian 
law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia” since 1991.102 
The establishment of the ICTY was an historic moment for international 
justice. It was the first international tribunal ever to be established by the UN. 
According to the President of the Tribunal, its only predecessors “the international 
military tribunals at [Nuremberg] and Tokyo, were created in very different 
circumstances and were based on moral and judicial principles of a fundamentally 
different nature.”103 The UN’s establishment of the ICTY was a “judicial response to 
the demands posed by the situation in the former Yugoslavia.”104 The UN Charter is 
the foundation document for the UN’s work and gives the UN primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. Chapter VII allows the 
Council to bypass the general prohibition of the “threat or use of force” encompassed 
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.105 In establishing the ICTY, the UNSC invoked its 
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows it to “determine the 
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existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and 
take military or non-military action to “restore international peace and security.”106  
 In the UN Secretary-General’s report pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution 
808 (1993), he notes that in the normal course of events, the establishment of an 
international tribunal would come at the conclusion of a treaty, drawn up and adopted 
by an appropriate international body, which the States parties would sign and ratify. 
However, this approach would require considerable time and would not guarantee that 
ratification is received from those states, which should be parties to the treaty. 
Therefore, in order to be truly effective, the Secretary-General asserted that the 
Tribunal should be established on the basis of Chapter VII, as “this approach would 
have the advantage of being expeditious and of being immediately effective as all 
states would be under a binding obligation to take whatever action is required to carry 
out a decision taken as an enforcement measure of Chapter VII.”107  
The ICTY’s mode of establishment under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
differentiates it from the Nuremberg tribunal. While Nuremberg was authorized by 
the four Allied powers of WWII, the ICTY was the first international criminal 
tribunal to be established by a globally recognized international body, the UN.108 In 
1994, the President of the ICTY argued that, “unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals, the Tribunal [was] truly international…the Tribunal is not the organ of a 
group of States; it is an organ of the whole international community.”109 However, 
similar claims could be made about the ICTY as it was authorized by a select group of 
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States—the Security Council, which consists of five permanent members—the US, 
UK, France, China, and Russia. While the founders of the Nuremberg tribunal and the 
ICTY had similar aims—the prosecution of war criminals under international law—
due to the different circumstances at the times of the tribunals’ establishment they 
adopted different ways of reaching these goals.  
The Legal Basis of the Nuremberg tribunal and the ICTY 
The legal basis of the Nuremberg tribunal was the London Charter, which the 
Allied governments signed on August 8, 1945. Having come to a conclusion on the 
mode of punishment for the major German war criminals, the Signatories drafted the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) (commonly known as the 
Nuremberg Charter), which was “annexed to and formed an integral part of the 
London Agreement.”110 Although the concept of individual criminal responsibility for 
war crimes was well established in international law prior to WWII, debate 
surrounded the legality of prosecuting individuals for crimes against humanity.111 
Individual accountability for violations of international humanitarian law was a new 
concept, which was not fully recognized until the Nuremberg tribunal. Pursuant to the 
Agreement, the Nuremberg tribunal was mandated under Article 6 of the Charter, “to 
try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, 
whether as individuals or members of organizations,” committed any crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal.112  
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Three broad categories of acts are defined as punishable as crimes under 
international law in the Nuremberg Charter. The first, crimes against peace, consists 
of “planning, preparing, initiating, or waging a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international undertakings, as well as participating in a common plan or 
conspiracy to accomplish any of the aforementioned acts. The second class of 
offenses, war crimes, consists of violations of the laws or customs of war.113 The third 
category, crimes against humanity, consists of murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population 
before or during war. 114  The principle that individuals rather than states are 
responsible for violations of international law is also enacted in the Charter. It 
provides that any individual who joins in a common plan to commit any of the 
foregoing offenses is responsible for the acts of all other persons involved in its 
execution.115 In defining these categories of offenses as criminal under international 
law, Nuremberg established that “there are certain crimes of international concern 
which incur individual criminal responsibility.”116 
Similarly, the ICTY was awarded jurisdiction over four categories of criminal 
offenses. In accordance with its Statute, the ICTY was mandated to prosecute 
“persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
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committed in the region of the former Yugoslavia” from 1991 onwards.117 However, 
in contrast to Nuremberg’s jurisdiction over both individuals and members of 
organizations, in accordance with Article 6 of its Statute, the ICTY, though having 
jurisdiction over individual persons, does not have the authority to prosecute 
“organizations, political parties, army units, administrative entities or other legal 
subjects” for aggression or violations of international humanitarian law.118 Articles 2 
to 5 of the ICTY Statute identify the four different categories of crimes over which it 
had jurisdiction. The first category of offenses, grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, sets forth rules for the wartime protection of civilians and those 
who are no longer participating in the hostilities. The second category, violations of 
the laws or customs of war, regulates the conduct of armed conflict.119 The third 
category, genocide, consists of any “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”120 The fourth 
category, crimes against humanity, consists of crimes directed against any civilian 
populations during an armed conflict of international or internal character.121 
The notion of crimes against humanity included in the ICTY Statute, were 
first recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal. The other 
three categories of offenses evolved over many decades. Specifically, the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
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principles, which set forth guidelines for determining what constitutes a war crime. In 
this regard, the ICTY reinforced and expanded on the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes established by the Nuremberg tribunal and further 
codified international humanitarian law. 122 
The Political Purpose of the International Tribunals 
The Nuremberg trials, which tried and punished German war criminals, have 
been described “as the last act of war and the first act of peace” following WWII.123 
The trials had two primary objectives. First, they were intended to legally condemn 
the abuses committed by the Nazis, and in doing so justify the Allies’ victory. In a 
1945 Memorandum to President Roosevelt, the Secretaries of State and War and the 
Attorney General asserted that “after Germany’s unconditional surrender the United 
Nations124 could, if elected, put to death the most notorious Nazi criminals, such as 
Hitler or Himmler, without trial or hearing.”125 However, they argued that the use of 
the judicial method was the “just and effective solution,” and would “command 
maximum public support…and receive the respect of history.”126   
In his report to the President in 1945 (which was widely accepted as an 
official statement of the position of the US), Justice Jackson contended that: 
The task of making this record complete and accurate, while memories are 
fresh, while witnesses are living, and while a tribunal is available, is too 
important to the future opinion of the world to be undertaken before the case 	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can be prepared to make a credible presentation. Intelligent, informed, and 
sober opinion will not be satisfied with less.127  
This quote clearly demonstrates the importance placed, from the beginning, on 
conducting a fair and deliberative trial. It was crucial that defendants were provided a 
full and fair opportunity to defend themselves on every charge in order to satisfy 
public opinion that justice had been done in the case of the Nazi war criminals. 
In his opening statement for the US at the Nuremberg trials, Justice Jackson 
reinforced the importance of making a complete and accurate record of abuses and 
outlined the Allies’ goals in conducting the trials: 
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the 
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the 
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever 
paid to Reason…We must never forget that the record on which we judge 
these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. 
To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. 
We must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that 
this trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations 
to do justice.128   
Although based on democratic notions of justice, critics regarded Nuremberg 
as a “show trial” because the Nazis were in essence being exposed to public 	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disapproval prior to their execution.129 In 1946, in response to critics of the tribunal, 
Justice Jackson, provided a clear explanation for the Allies’ decision to utilize 
military trials to investigate and punish Nazis leaders. He noted that the alternative 
mode of punishment was summary execution; therefore, “the choice that faced [US] 
President Truman was a simple one.”130 Justice Jackson asserted “if we had stood 
these twenty-two defendants against the wall and shot them ‘by executive 
determination,’ in ten years the United States would be defenseless against suspicion 
that we did not give them a trial because we could not prove their guilt or because 
they could prove their innocence.”131 In this way, the political purpose of the 
Nuremberg trials is apparent in the Signatories’ effort to satisfy Allied public opinion 
that justice had been done. 
 Moreover, Debra DeLaet argues that the Roosevelt administration’s 
interpretation of the tribunal’s purpose provides important insight into the principal 
aims of the trials—prosecuting Nazis for waging a war of aggression.132 Although the 
Nuremberg tribunal was mandated to try individuals for committing crimes in all 
three categories of crimes laid out in its charter the trials focused primarily on 
prosecuting Nazis for crimes against peace. According to DeLaet, this emphasis on 
crimes against peace, as opposed to crimes against humanity was indicative of the 
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Allies interpretation of the tribunal’s purpose.133 DeLaet reminds us of Gary Bass’ 
argument that “‘in a rare explicit statement on war criminals, Roosevelt had called for 
indicting the top Nazis for waging war. He mentioned aggression, not the Holocaust, 
atrocities against civilians, or war crimes. At Nuremberg’s conclusion, Truman 
echoed Roosevelt: ‘The principles established and the results achieved places 
International Law on the side of peace as against aggressive war.’”134 In this way, the 
Nuremberg tribunal allowed the victorious powers to assume jurisdiction over the 
losers. 
A second political purpose of the Nuremberg trials was to establish new rules 
of international conduct and promote peace.135 Justice Jackson contended that the law 
of the Nuremberg Charter “ushers international law into a new era where it is 
accorded with the common sense of mankind that a war of deliberate and unprovoked 
attack deserves universal condemnation and its authors’ condign penalties.”136 He 
argues that: 
If the nations, which command the great physical forces of the world, want the 
society of nations to be governed by law, these principles [laid out in the 
Nuremberg Charter] may contribute to that end. If those who have the power 
of decision revert to the concept of unlimited and irresponsible sovereignty, 
neither this nor any charter will save the world from international 
lawlessness.137 
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In his final report to the President, Justice Jackson asserted that the primary purpose 
of the Nuremberg tribunal was “to bring the weight of law and criminal sanctions to 
bear in support of…peaceful and humanitarian principles.” 138  In this way, the 
“assumption of Western moral superiority implicit in the liberal values expressed in 
the Indictment was accepted as a necessary underpinning for the creation of a new 
moral and political order” following the end of WWII.139 
In contrast to the four Allied powers who authorized the Nuremberg tribunal, 
direct protagonists in the Balkan conflict did not establish the ICTY. Acting as 
representatives of the international community, which declared the conflict a threat to 
international peace and security, the members of the UNSC established the ICTY. 
Instead of being officially established after the conflict had ended, to prosecute 
offenders from the losing side, the ICTY was established to prosecute all major ethnic 
groups involved in the ongoing conflict: Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, with the aim of 
preventing further crime and facilitating peace in the region.140 Although this mode of 
establishment was different than that of the Nuremberg tribunal, the ICTY’s founders 
were similarly motivated by political objectives. As representatives of the 
international community, the UNSC was motivated to establish the ICTY in order to 
stop the violence in the former Yugoslavia and safeguard international peace and 
security without the use of military force.141 
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According to Judge Carmel Agius, the Vice President of the ICTY, the 
message that the UN sent back in 1993 was “loud and clear.”142 In creating the ICTY, 
the UNSC sent a distinct political message that those who committed war crimes 
would not face impunity. Judge Agius asserted that the goal of the Tribunal’s judges 
was to establish the truth about the conflict “because it is always the point where you 
need to start from if you are going to embark on a journey of reconciliation and 
rebuilding of society where the fabric has been very badly torn.”143 In this way, the 
ICTY aimed to facilitate reconciliation in the region through reliable criminal 
proceedings.144 
The ICTY’s principal objectives were threefold: “to do justice, to deter further 
crimes, and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”145 The first 
objective, “to bring to justice the persons who are responsible” for crimes perpetrated 
in the former Yugoslavia is set out in the preamble to UNSC Resolution 827 
(1993).146 This preamble also lays out the second objective that the establishment of 
the Tribunal “will contribute to ensuring that such violations [of international 
humanitarian law] are halted and effectively redressed.”147 According to the ICTY 
President:  
One of the main aims of the Security Council was to establish a judicial 
process capable of dissuading the parties to the conflict from perpetrating 
further crimes. It was hoped that, by bringing to justice those accused of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Nerma Jelacic, Szabo, and Kosca-Vrlazic, “Legacy of the ICTY in the Former 
Yugoslavia,” 20. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Janine Natalya Clark, “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and 
Reconciliation,” Contemporary Justice Review 11, no. 4 (December 2008): 331, 
doi:10.1080/10282580802482603. 
145 First Annual Report, supra note 101 at 11.  
146 UNSC, Res 827, UN Doc S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), En.   
147 Ibid. 
	  	  
LaVilla 38 
massacres and similar egregious violations of international humanitarian law, 
both belligerents and civilians would be discouraged from committing further 
atrocities. In short, the Tribunal [was] supposed to act as a powerful deterrent 
to all parties against continued participation in inhumane acts.148 
The UNSC’s final objective in establishing the Tribunal was “to contribute to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace.”149 Established in the face of a “threat to 
international peace and security” as a measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
it was conceived that the Tribunal would act as a measure designed to 
“gradually…promote the end of armed hostilities and a return to normality.”150 In the 
ICTY President’s first annual report on the ICTY in 1994, he contended: 
How could one hope to restore the rule of law and the development of stable, 
constructive and healthy relations among ethnic groups, within or between 
independent States, if the culprits are allowed to go unpunished? Those who 
have suffered, directly or indirectly, from their crimes are unlikely to forgive 
or set aside their deep resentment…if no fair trial is held.151  
This quote clearly illustrates the UNSC’s motivation in establishing the ICTY as a 
measure to promote reconciliation in the region. Specifically, the ICTY aimed to 
contribute to a lasting peace in the region by individualizing guilt. Its founders 
believed that if the responsibility for the serious abuses committed in the region were 
not attributed to individuals, whole ethnic groups would be held accountable for the 
crimes and collectively categorized as criminal. The ICTY was thus established to 
“promote peace by meting out justice in a manner conducive to the full establishment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 First Annual Report, supra note 102 at 11-12. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid., 12.  
151 Ibid. 
	  	  
LaVilla 39 
of healthy and cooperative relations among the various national and ethnic groups” in 
the former Yugoslavia.152  
Although the two tribunals shared similar motives in seeing that justice had 
been done, the aims of the ICTY varied from those of the Nuremberg tribunal in one 
specific way. Special emphasis was placed on the role that establishing facts about the 
conflict could play in contributing to the process of reconciliation in the region of the 
former Yugoslavia. The Council established the ICTY with the goal of distributing 
justice, “but at the same time, it [was] also a means to achieving a progressively 
reconciled society co-operating in peace and prosperity.”153 While the mission of the 
ICTY mirrored Nuremberg’s international norm of individual accountability and 
preventing impunity, it was also designed to encompass the restoration of 
international peace and security and culminate in reconciliation in the region of the 
former Yugoslavia.154  
The goals of the ICTY cannot be properly understood without taking into 
consideration the circumstances under which the UNSC decided to establish an 
international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law in the region of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. 
Because the ICTY was not established by direct protagonists in the Balkan conflict, 
and tried and prosecuted individuals belonging to all three major ethnic groups 
involved in the conflict, critiques that the tribunal served “victor’s justice” are not as 
applicable as they had been with Nuremberg.155 However, the UNSC’s decision to 
establish the Tribunal was also inherently political as it was prompted by “the total 	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lack of progress towards peace in the region and the need to demonstrate to the 
international community that the UN was not sitting back idly while thousands were 
being brutally abused or massacred.”156  
Although the UN’s aims in establishing the ICTY were different than the 
Allies’ aims in establishing the Nuremberg tribunal, one tribunal is not superior to the 
other. The founders of both tribunals took note of the specific circumstances of the 
conflicts they faced when establishing these international tribunals. In the case of the 
Nuremberg tribunal, the Allied governments officially established the tribunal after 
the war had ended, with the goal of prosecuting Nazi war criminals in an effort to 
satisfy public opinion, establish new rules of international order, and maintain peace. 
In the case of the ICTY, the UN established the tribunal while conflict was still 
turbulent in the former Yugoslavia with the goal of deterring further crimes and 
restoring international peace and security in the region of the former Yugoslavia. As a 
consequence of these circumstances, the Nuremberg tribunal focused primarily on 
crimes against peace (jus ad bellum) when it came to prosecuting Nazi leaders, while 
the ICTY focused more heavily on violations of the laws and customs of war (jus in 
bello) when it came to prosecuting Balkan warmongers.  
A Fundamental Change: The Tribunals’ Territorial Jurisdiction 
While both tribunals were established to see that justice had been done and 
hold individual perpetrators accountable for their actions under international law, they 
did not share the same relationship with the regions for which they distributed justice. 
Specifically, their relationship to national courts was distinct. Concurrent to the 
Nuremberg trials, the Allied governments were engaged in efforts to denazify157 and 
democratize Germany. However, although taken on by the Allied governments, these 	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efforts were not the direct actions of the Nuremberg tribunal.158 In legal terms, the 
Nuremberg tribunal “did not address the relationship with national courts. It did 
however establish the right of the competent authority of any signatory of the 
[Nuremberg] Constitution.” 159  Each Allied government was authorized in their 
occupation zone, to try persons responsible for war crimes. Specifically, pursuant to 
Part I Article 10 “in cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the 
Tribunal (Nuremberg), the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have 
the right to bring individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military 
or occupation courts.”160 Additionally, Part I Article 11 provides that: 
Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before a national, 
military or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of this Charter, with a 
crime other than of membership in a criminal group or organization and such 
court may, after convicting him, impose upon him punishment independent of 
and additional to the punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in 
the criminal activities of such group or organization.161 
Following the trial and prosecution of military and political leaders of Nazi Germany 
before the IMT at Nuremberg, the US conducted twelve trials, known as the 
Subsequent Nuremberg Trials, to “try and punish persons charged with offenses 
recognized as crimes in Article II of the Council Law No. 10.”162 Additionally, lower-
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level officials and officers were tried in subsequent war crimes trials before military 
courts in the British, French, and Soviet zones of occupied Germany and Austria in 
the immediate post-war period. The purpose of these trials was to determine the guilt 
of second-tier Nazis accused of the crimes, which had been established as criminal by 
the Nuremberg tribunal.163  
In the case of the ICTY, the Tribunal shared concurrent jurisdiction with 
national courts in the former Yugoslavia in relation to the crimes over which the 
Tribunal had jurisdiction. Pursuant to Article 9(1) of the ICTY Statute: “the 
international Tribunal and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to 
prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.”164 However, Article 
9(2) established that the ICTY had primacy over the national courts and at “at any 
stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal [could] formally request national 
courts to defer to the competence of the International tribunal in accordance with the 
present Statute and the [Tribunal’s] Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” 165 
Additionally, the ICTY could refer cases to competent national authorities in the 
former Yugoslavia.166 
Chapter Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter is to compare and contrast the Nuremberg 
tribunal and the ICTY. By examining the factual circumstances surrounding their 
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establishment, their legal basis, their founders’ principal aims, and the tribunals’ 
criminal and territorial jurisdiction it illustrates that these two tribunals differ in a few 
key ways. First, while the Nuremberg tribunal was formally established after the 
defeat and surrender of the European Axis countries, the ICTY was established while 
conflict was still ongoing in the region of the former Yugoslavia. Although both 
tribunals were similarly established to fulfill specific political aims, because of the 
different circumstances that led to their establishment, the ICTY raises several issues 
that were not encountered by the Nuremberg tribunal.   
For instance, the two tribunals differ in their criminal and territorial 
jurisdiction. The criminal jurisdiction of the ICTY differed from that of the 
Nuremberg tribunal in two fundamental respects. First, the ICTY had jurisdiction 
over war crimes and crimes against humanity, specifically genocide; however, unlike 
Nuremberg, it did not have the authority to prosecute states for aggression or crimes 
against peace.167 Second, the ICTY dealt with crimes perpetrated in the course of both 
international and internal armed conflict, while Nuremberg addressed only crimes 
committed in the course of an international armed conflict.168  
The two tribunals also differ in their territorial jurisdiction. This chapter has 
illustrated how the Nuremberg Charter made important provisions for the punishment 
of criminal organizations. In doing so, it established that individuals belonging to an 
organization, which Nuremberg found to be criminal, could be subject to subsequent 
trials held before national courts, conducted by the Signatories. However, the 
Nuremberg tribunal did not have a relationship with national courts in Germany. By 	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contrast, the ICTY was established to share concurrent jurisdiction with national 
courts in the region of the former Yugoslavia. Although the ICTY and national courts 
shared jurisdiction, the ICTY was authorized to intervene and take over at any stage 
of national proceedings, if proved to be in the interest of international justice.  
The ICTY’s concurrent jurisdiction with national courts had major 
implications for its role and function in the region of the former Yugoslavia. 
Peacebuilding efforts on behalf of the ICTY came about as a consequence of this 
relationship between the Tribunal and national courts. In 2003, in anticipation of 
closing its doors, the ICTY developed an unprecedented relationship with national 
judiciaries in the region. Unlike Nuremberg, it made a direct contribution to 
increasing the capacity of the region’s national courts through a number of avenues 
including adjudicating war crimes cases through the transfer of evidence, knowledge, 
and jurisprudence to national judiciaries. 169  The following chapter will focus 
specifically on the ICTY’s relationship with national jurisdictions using Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BIH) as an illustration of the role and activities of the ICTY in the 
region of the former Yugoslavia, specifically with regards to public outreach and 
domestic rule of law capacity building efforts.  
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Chapter 3: A Look at the ICTY’s New Role 
 
The ICTY played an important role in the peacebuilding process in the former 
Yugoslavia through outreach and capacity building efforts. Beginning in 1996, the 
ICTY pioneered a relationship with the national judiciaries of BiH, and other regions 
of the former Yugoslavia. Specifically, it took on new responsibilities, outside the 
traditional role of international tribunals. In this way, the ICTY established a new 
precedent for the role of international war crimes tribunals. Not only did it reinforce 
international norms of accountability, it demonstrated the importance of promoting a 
culture of rule of law, in which “no one, including government, is above the law; 
where laws protect fundamental rights; and where justice is acceptable to all in the 
aftermath of conflict.”170 There was a realization that transitional justice, specifically 
criminal prosecutions, was a means to achieve peacebuilding by rule of law.  
In order to ensure that grievances are redressed and actions are brought against 
individuals for abuses, a criminal justice system must be “capable of investigating and 
adjudicating criminal offences effectively, impartially, and without proper influence, 
while ensuring that the rights of suspects and victims are protected.”171 In more 
specific terms, an effective criminal justice system is defined by its ability to conduct 
fair and impartial trials. Throughout its existence, the ICTY realized that in order to 
have its intended effect on the region it would need to ensure that the national courts, 
with which it shared jurisdiction, were capable of conducting fair and impartial trials. 
Because the rule of law “is often a casualty during times of war” the Tribunal 
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implemented a number of key programs in order to “re-establish the rule of law in 
criminal matters” in the region of the former Yugoslavia.172  
The Rules of the Road Procedure 
In 1996, a procedure called “Rules of the Road” was established under the 
Rome Agreement to protect against arbitrary arrests on suspicion of war crimes. This 
program “regulated the arrest and indictment of alleged perpetrators of war crimes by 
national authorities.”173 Under this procedure, the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) was required to review and determine a case to have “credible charges” before 
national authorities could arrest a suspect.174 If the OTP did not find a case to be 
credible, local prosecutors could not proceed with an arrest. Under this procedure, 
1,419 files involving 4,985 subjects were reviewed. Out of these 1,419 local war 
crimes case files, the ICTY granted local prosecutors permission to prosecute 848 
persons. In addition to the Rules of the Road program, a Transition Team within the 
OTP was designated to pass along useful evidence and hand over cases involving 
lower and immediate level cases to national courts.175  
The ICTY Completion Strategy 
Ten years after its establishment, the ICTY was operating at full capacity. The 
national judicial systems in the former Yugoslavia were beginning to “demonstrate 
varying degrees of intent to improve their ability to handle war crimes.”176 After a 
comprehensive evaluation of the work done over those ten years, the judges of the 
ICTY devised and adopted a strategic plan to close down the Tribunal. On August 28, 
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2003 this plan, known as the Completion Strategy, was created under Resolution 1503 
(2003) to ensure that the Tribunal concluded “its mission successfully, in a timely 
manner and in coordination with domestic legal systems in the former Yugoslavia.”177 
The Completion Strategy devised by the ICTY aimed to complete “all investigations 
by the end of 2004, all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, and all of 
the Tribunal’s work in 2010” (see Figure 1).178  
Figure 1. ICTY Three-Phase ‘Completion Strategy’ Timeline 
 
In order to do so, the ICTY decided to concentrate its efforts on “the 
prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders suspected of being responsible for 
crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction and transferring cases involving those who may 
not bear this level of responsibility to competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, 
as well as strengthening of the capacity of such jurisdictions.”179 As a core component 
of the plan to close down the tribunal, the ICTY began transferring cases to 
competent national judiciaries. Consequently, it began assisting in strengthening the 
capacity of the national judiciaries of the countries of the former Yugoslavia and 
making evidence collected by the ICTY available to national prosecutors.180 Finally, 
as noted by Vice President of the ICTY Judge Carmel Agius, peer-to-peer meetings 	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between ICTY judges and local judges, prosecutors, and other officials were 
organized in order to ensure an effective transition from the international tribunal to 
national courts.181 
Capacity Building Efforts 
The ICTY demonstrated the contribution international criminal tribunals could 
make to building local judicial capacity and strengthening the rule of law in post-
conflict societies. According to Martin Petrov, Chief of the Immediate Office of the 
Registrar, ICTY, “the ICTY has always been meant to be a temporary institution—we 
have all known from the day when it was established that one day it would close its 
doors. And that is why it had a limited mandate…to prosecute only the highest 
ranking military and political leaders.”182 There was an expectation that local legal 
professionals and institutions in the region would handle war crimes cases after the 
Tribunal closed its doors.183 In attempting to fill the rule of law vacuum in the 
aftermath of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY established an 
unprecedented relationship with local legal professionals and national judiciaries in 
BiH. Specifically, the Tribunal focused on transferring know-how, expertise, and 
materials to domestic courts in the region in order to facilitate the “implementation of 
international standards and best developed practices within the local judiciaries.”184 
Much of this transfer of expertise and materials took place under the War 
Crimes Justice Project, a collaborative project between the ICTY, the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice 
Research Institute (UNICRI), with funding from the European Union. The aim of this 	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project was to “meet the identified outstanding needs” of local judiciaries determined 
in a nine-month long needs assessment preceding the project, which asked local legal 
practitioners to define the challenges they were facing and the best ways to address 
these needs.185 Based on these recommendations the project organized activities and 
developed the necessary tools to support the national jurisdictions in handling the 
investigation and prosecution of wars crimes. In turn, the project aimed to “support 
national ownership and provide sustainable benefits,” in order to ensure that actions 
are taken against individuals for offenses in the region and justice is brought to 
victims after the ICTY closed its doors.186 The main components of the project 
included: bolstering staffing capacity in key areas, developing curricula and materials, 
professional development of local legal professionals, and access to the ICTY’s 
material and expertise (see Figure 2).187 
One of the main outstanding needs, identified by institutions within the 
national jurisdictions, was staffing capacity in key areas such as analysis and legal 
research. In order to address this need, the project sponsored the hiring of 32 
additional support staff at domestic justice institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, and Croatia. Throughout the course of the project, these additional support 
staff members were provided with training and support in order to promote 
retention.188 
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Figure 2. The War Crimes Justice Project Focus Areas 
 
A second project focus area was the development of curricula on international 
humanitarian law and training materials. These curricula, training materials, and 
various other research and analysis tools, were developed in collaboration with the 
International Criminal Law Series (ICLS), several judicial and prosecutorial training 
institutions. One major success of this partnership was the development of the “first-
ever training curriculum on international law and practice for local justice actors in 
the region.” 189  This manual, which outlines the ICTY defense counsel’s best 
practices, was produced to support practitioner’s legal training in the region. As such, 
it “provides training institutions with a platform for the sustainable delivery of 
training programmes for war crimes justice actors.”190 As a component of this project, 
the UNICRI developed an e-learning portal to increase legal practitioners and judicial 
and prosecutorial training institutions access to materials relating to war crimes.191 
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A third outstanding need identified by the national authorities was the 
professional development of the legal professionals working on war-crimes cases in 
the region. In order to address this need, the project organized “working visits” for 
staff members from the prosecuting authorities of the region and “peer-to-peer 
meetings” between judges, prosecutors, and other local professionals. These visits and 
meetings were designed to facilitate the exchange of information between local legal 
practitioners, as well as between local legal practitioners and legal practitioners at the 
ICTY. In addition, the project provided 800 justice professionals with training on 
topics such as “international criminal law, the use of analytical tools and working 
with vulnerable witnesses.”192 Together, these meeting, discussions, and training 
events on legal issues aimed to strengthen co-operation between practitioners in the 
region.193 
Lastly, the project focused on national judiciaries’ access to the ICTY’s 
materials and expertise. In order to improve the ability of local legal practitioners, 
emphasis was placed on the production of transcripts of key proceedings and the most 
important Appeals Chamber decisions into Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian. A total of 
60,800 pages of proceeding transcripts, which national judicial institutions had 
identified as “most relevant,” were produced in local languages by the ICTY.194 Over 
18,500 of these 60,800 pages were produced in direct response to requests from 
national jurisdictions (see Figure 3). This capacity-building function greatly increased 
the number of transcripts of proceedings and materials provided by the ICTY, which 
legal practitioners in the region can directly use in all phases of their criminal 
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proceedings. Additionally, the project organized trainings for lawyers in the region on 
accessing the Tribunal’s records. 195 
 
 
Figure 3. Pages of transcripts of the ICTY proceedings identified as most relevant by 
national legal institutions translated into local languages (Serbian, Bosnian, and 
Croatian) under the War Crimes Justice Project 
 
Together these four project focus areas aimed to assist national judiciaries in 
not only trying cases of low and mid-level perpetrators transferred by the ICTY, but 
also supporting national judiciaries in investigating and prosecuting alleged 
perpetrators not indicted by the ICTY. The project made a significant contribution to 
national prosecutions in the countries of the former Yugoslavia by enabling the 
efficient exchange of information and expertise between the ICTY and the national 
judiciaries, with the hopes of ensuring the continuation of regional war crimes 
prosecutions long after the Tribunal completed its mandate.196 
The ICTY’s Registry’s Court Management and Support Service Section 
(CMSS) and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) also provided assistance to national 
judiciaries in a number of ways. The CMSS and OTP, which handle Requests for 
Assistance (RFAs) from states and international organizations investigating war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 ICTY Annual Outreach Report 2012, 25. 
196 Ibid., 26. 
18,500, 
30% 
42,300, 
70% 
Pages produced in response to 
specific requests from courts 
and prosecutors in the region 
Other pages produced  
	  	  
LaVilla 53 
crimes and crimes against humanity, facilitated a number of presentations and visits 
to promote knowledge transfer within the region.197 Additionally, the OTP has 
established close ties with regional prosecutors, which “promotes an exchange of 
ideas and the development of inter-institutional understanding and memory” through 
training, technical assistance, and overall guidance from the OTP’s Transition 
Team.198 Finally, a focus has been placed on public outreach and legal support in 
BiH.199 
In addition to assuming a role in strengthening the capacity of national 
judiciaries through knowledge transfer and establishing closer ties between the OTP 
and regional prosecutors. The ICTY, in 2005, in collaboration with the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR),200 established a War Crimes Chamber (WCC) in the 
Court of BiH in response to the shortcomings of the domestic courts in Bosnia.201 
Since the establishment of the WCC, the ICTY has continued to engage in capacity 
building with the Court of BiH. The WCC was established to strengthen the national 
judicial system in BiH by investigating and prosecuting war crimes committed in 
Bosnia in accordance with international law.202 In order to maintain the timeline of 
the tribunal’s closure laid out in Resolution 1503 (2003) the ICTY began to refer 
lower and intermediate cases to the Chamber.203 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Ibid., 25. 
198 Ibid., 26. 
199 Ibid., 27. 
200 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an ad hoc international 
organization tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that the democratic 
progression of Bosnia-Herzegovina is successful, peaceful, and complies with all 
aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreement. For more information on the OHR, see: 
http://www.ohr.int/ 
201 Subotic, p. 142. 
202 Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, 142. 
203 UNSC, Res 1503, UN Doc S/RES/1503 (August 28, 2003), En.  
	  	  
LaVilla 54 
According to the Head of Communications at the ICTY, the relationship 
between the ICTY and the State Court of BiH is the strongest in the region and 
cooperation between the ICTY and the Court of BiH is full speed ahead. One 
indicator of their successful cooperation is the number of requests and responses to 
requests between the two courts, which is the highest in the region. A second 
indicator is the continuing presence of capacity building efforts at the Court. In 2012, 
ICTY judges and prosecutors were still meeting with and providing training to judges 
and prosecutors in the Court of BiH. Although overall the relationship between the 
two courts is the strongest in the region, the ICTY Representative explained that the 
Tribunal was not meant to forcibly direct the Court, but to provide support to legal 
professionals and institutions in the region. It couldn’t exert pressure on national and 
regional judiciaries; it could only offer expertise, help, and lessons learned to local 
officials when they were designing their own strategies for investigating and 
prosecuting war crimes. She asserted that the ICTY was not there to impose its ideas 
on national judiciaries, but to provide assistance to local legal professionals in their 
legal system. This is important because the ICTY and national judiciaries’ systems 
are different. You can’t just “copy and paste.”204  Therefore, the relationship functions 
on capacity-building and outreach efforts in order to support national judiciaries in 
conducting fair and impartial war crimes trials. 205 
The ICTY Outreach Program 
Over the course of its mandate, the ICTY has developed an extraordinary 
legacy. During the immediate post-war period, the goal of the Tribunal to prevent 
impunity and face the past in the Balkans was gravely inhibited by the lack of the 
public’s knowledge of the court in the region. In an effort to confront the gap in 	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awareness and strengthen the relationship between the Tribunal and the local 
communities in the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY created an Outreach Program in 
1999, and opened field offices in Zagreb, Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Pristina.206 In order 
to bridge the gap between the ICTY and the local communities of former Yugoslavia, 
the ICTY Outreach Program focused on engaging with a number of different 
constituents including youth, the media, local communities, and as discussed earlier 
national judiciaries (see Figure 4).207 
 
Figure 4. ICTY Outreach Program focus areas  
 
One ICTY Representative based in The Hague, which I interviewed for this 
research, explained that it is important that people in the former Yugoslavia not only 
understand the achievements of ICTY, which are numerous, but also understand the 
wider impact of the Tribunal on the ground. She asserted that local populations “need 
to understand judgments. This is necessary in order for them to recognize the viability 
of international war crimes tribunals.” 208  In particular, she explained that the 
establishment of facts is crucial to reconciliation in BiH because the communities are 
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so politically and ethnically polarized.209 At the 2012 Legacy of the ICTY in the 
former Yugoslavia conference held in Sarajevo, the Vice President (VP) of the ICTY 
concurred with this argument that, “the future of the country and its citizens cannot be 
built without an honest confrontation of the past.”210 Similarly, an Editor at the 
Balkan Insight Reporting Network (BIRN) BiH maintained that if the “findings of 
war crimes are not adequately communicated to the people, explained to the people, 
then you are not going to have reconciliation.”211 
Today, the link drawn by these individuals between the success of 
reconciliation in the region and the communication of facts established in war crimes 
trials to the people for which the Tribunal distributes justice is clear; however, the 
importance of informing the local population of the Tribunals’ findings was not 
realized for the first six years of its mandate.212 In establishing an Outreach Program, 
the ICTY “recognized that it had a role to play in the process of dealing with the past 
in the former Yugoslavia, one of the key challenges for societies emerging from 
conflict.”213 It came with a recognition that the work of the Tribunal “would resonate 
far beyond the judicial mandate of deciding guilt or innocence of individual 
accused.”214 In this regard, one ICTY Outreach Representative in BiH asserted that 
the “experience of Germany is precious to us, but it is different than the Bosnia 
experience and [it is] the same with Palestine and Israel and all around the globe. It is 
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very important to be present and promote the role of the ICTY and prosecution of war 
crimes as the basis of reconciliation and dealing with the past” in the Balkans.215  
A main focus of the Outreach Program is reaching out and informing younger 
generations in the region of the former Yugoslavia about the Tribunal’s purpose and 
work. It aims to increase students’ awareness about international criminal law and 
explain how the ICTY has helped prosecute those alleged perpetrators most 
responsible for atrocities committed in the region since 1991. Specifically, Outreach 
representatives fulfill this aim through a number of avenues including organizing 
study visits to the ICTY in which students can learn first-hand about the Tribunal’s 
work, facilitating internships for young professions to learn about the Tribunal’s rules 
and procedures, and coordinating presentations, lectures, witness testimonies, and 
films and debates with high school and university students in order to encourage 
discussion of the ICTY’s achievements and legacy. In 2012, a total of 80 
presentations and lectures (see Figure 5) undertaken by the Outreach Program reached 
1,651 university (see Figure 6) and 1,771 high school students (see Figure 7).216  
 
Figure 5. University lectures and high school presentations given in the region of the 
former Yugoslavia in 2012  
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Figure 6. Statistical breakdown of the number of university students in the region of 
the former Yugoslavia that attended ICTY Outreach Program lectures in 2012 
 
 
Figure 7. Statistical breakdown of the number of high school students in the region of 
the former Yugoslavia that attended ICTY Outreach Program presentations in 2012 
 
During these study visits to high schools, the Outreach Program officers 
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presentations are given to students between the ages of 17-19 years old. Typically, 
one or two classes, totaling 30 students attend each presentation. The presentations 
have two parts. The first part is a general presentation about the purpose and work of 
the ICTY. The second part is a presentation of the ICTY’s cases related to that 
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debate about what they just learned at the end of the presentation. According to one 
ICTY Representative that I interviewed, students are encouraged “to be actively 
involved the presentation, to define the basic terms and principles of humanitarian 
law before we develop the concept of international justice, and the Tribunal, and why 
it is important.”217 He explained that students are asked to “become a part of the 
presentation itself by their commands, their views, and their additions.”218 According 
to the ICTY Representative, these presentations play an important role in helping the 
younger generation understand certain aspects and concepts, such as common law and 
pleas bargaining, which are not familiar in the region. Each presentation is followed 
by a questionnaire, which gauges the participants’ satisfaction with the presentation 
itself. 219 
The media also plays an important role in establishing and maintaining the 
ICTY’s legacy. As such, the Outreach Program also focuses on media outreach 
efforts. In order to maintain an open relationship with journalists, the Outreach 
Program utilizes social media to disseminate “quick and concise information” about 
the Tribunal, its judgments, events, and Outreach projects. 220  Additionally, the 
Tribunal’s website houses close to 18,000 documents, which range from the 
Tribunal’s Statute to courtroom filings. The website also features an Interactive Map 
web feature, which details the crimes investigated and adjudicated at the ICTY; pages 
that highlight current and past Outreach efforts; and video-streaming services for trial 
broadcast.221 Finally, the ICTY organizes trainings for reporters and journalists on 
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how to access its documents and transcripts and study visits to the Tribunal.222 In 
2012, the ICTY Outreach program sent out 116 press releases and advisories, and 
held 39 press briefings.223 Furthermore, 4,203,899 pages were viewed on the ICTY’s 
website (see Figure 9) and 1,092 people liked the ICTY Facebook page (see Figure 
10).224 
 
 
Figure 9. ICTY Website Page Views in 2012 
 
Figure 10. ICTY Facebook Likes in 2012 (May to December)  
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The Outreach Program also engages in community outreach efforts. In 2012, it 
created, promoted, and distributed its first feature-length documentary entitled 
‘Sexual Violence and the Triumph of Justice,’ which outlines the ICTY’s role in the 
prosecution and adjudication of wartime sexual violence.225 Thousands of copies of 
the film were produced and distributed throughout the region of the former 
Yugoslavia. As of November 2012, a few hundred alone had been distributed in BiH. 
According to the ICTY Representative, some universities in BIH have been using the 
documentary as an educational tool, screening part of the film as part of their regular 
classes.226 
Other community outreach efforts include meetings between the OTP and 
victims and members of the public, establishing information centers to preserve 
copies of public Tribunal records and establish future generations’ permanent access 
to these documents, and organizing Legacy conferences in the regions of the former 
Yugoslavia to discuss the initiative dialogue between local stakeholders about the 
Tribunal’s role and legacy in the region.227 In 2012, 157 people from the region of the 
former Yugoslavia (see Figure 11) and 9,063 people from the rest of the world visited 
the Tribunal (see Figure 12).228 
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Figure 11. Number of people from the former Yugoslavia that visited the ICTY in 
2012 
 
 
Figure 12. Number of visitors from the rest of the world that visited the ICTY in 2012  
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crimes.230 Panels of Tribunal staff, who had been directly involved in investigating, 
prosecuting, and adjudicating war crimes cases at the ICTY, gave “candid and 
comprehensive presentations” in the towns most affected by “the crimes at the heart 
of the Tribunal’s work.”231 The conferences provided an opportunity for domestic 
stakeholders to learn “first-hand” about the ICTY’s work; learn about the context in 
which the Tribunal works, and discuss the community’s expectations of the 
Tribunal.232 
Dealing with the Past Beyond the Tribunal 
On December 2012, the UNSC established a Residual Mechanism, to be the 
legal successor of the ICTY and the ICTR.233 The structure of the Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) closely mirrors that of the ICTY. It has two 
branches, for the ICTY and ICTR respectively, which share one prosecutor, one 
president, and one registrar. Although this Mechanism will carry on the essential 
functions of the Tribunal, it does not share the ICTY’s full mandate.234 Like the 
ICTY, the MICT is a temporary institution. It will continue to operate until the 
Security Council decides that it has fulfilled its mandate.235 Since July 1, 2013, for 
ICTY cases, the MICT has had “jurisdiction to designate enforcement States, 
including for persons thereafter convicted” by the Tribunal. It has also assumed the 
role of the ICTY President,  “to supervise the enforcement of sentences and to decide 
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on requests for pardon or communication of sentence, including convicted persons 
already serving their sentence.”236 
This mechanism will continue part of the work of the ICTY and assist national 
jurisdictions in investigating and prosecuting war crimes.237 At present, the ICTY is 
responsible for completing all ongoing proceedings. However, any new proceedings 
or notices of appeal filed are to be carried out by the MICT. Moreover, the MICT has 
jurisdiction over a number of other functions including enforcing sentences handed 
down by the Tribunal, requests for early release, and protection of witnesses.238 The 
Mechanism is also responsible, at present, for assisting national judiciaries. It 
responds to requests for assistance on transfer of evidence.239 Although the Outreach 
Program will remain separate from the ICTY and the MICT, as trials at the ICTY 
winds down, outreach will increase. According to an ICTY Representative the 
Outreach Program field offices will only remain in those countries that still have 
cases on trial.240 
Chapter Conclusion 
This examination of the ICTY’s completion strategy, public outreach and 
capacity building efforts has illustrated the relationship between the ICTY, national 
judiciaries, and the local communities for which the Tribunal distributed justice. In its 
decision to close the Tribunal, the Security Council reinforced the ICTY’s 
responsibility in achieving reconciliation and establishing the rule of law.241  It 
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strengthening national judicial capacity to prosecute war crimes. Cooperation was 
built between the ICTY and the national courts, specifically the State Court of BiH. 
While the Nuremberg tribunal established a number of important international legal 
norms and led to the prosecution of Nazis in other national courts, it did not assume 
the same role as the ICTY in supporting and empowering national jurisdictions. 
Today, the legacy of the ICTY is not only predicated on its contribution to 
international law, it depends on its cooperation with national judiciaries, local 
populations of the former Yugoslavia, and the media. The following chapter will 
discuss possible explanations for this difference between the Nuremberg tribunal and 
the ICTY. In addition, chapter four will discuss the larger implications of these 
changes, specifically the idea of legacy and policy implications for international 
criminal tribunals that may be established in the future. 
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Chapter 4: Possible Explanations and Implications 
 
The shift in the role of international criminal tribunals since the early years 
after WWII is an intriguing one that could be usefully explored in further research. 
This paper examined the changing relationship between international war crimes 
tribunals and reconciliation in post-conflict societies since WWII. Using the 
Nuremberg tribunal and the ICTY as case studies, it illustrated how these two 
important international tribunals differ from one another. Most importantly, it 
demonstrated that their differences range from the mode in which they were 
established to the relationship they have with national jurisdictions and the local 
communities for which they distributed justice. Primarily, unlike Nuremberg, the 
ICTY played a role in the process of peacebuilding in the region of the former 
Yugoslavia by taking on the task of rebuilding and strengthening the capacity of 
national judicial institutions. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this shift in the function and 
role of international war crimes tribunals in post-conflict societies since WWII. The 
first part of this chapter will look at some of the possible reasons for this variation in 
the relationship between the two tribunals and the regions for which they distributed 
justice. The second part of this chapter will draw conclusions about how this 
evolution may impact international judicial intervention in the future and discuss the 
larger implications of international criminal tribunals engaging in the peacebuilding 
process in societies devastated by conflict. 
Possible Explanations for the ICTY’s New Role 
One possible explanation for why the ICTY adopted a role in the 
peacebuilding process in the region of the former Yugoslavia is the factual 
circumstances surrounding its establishment. The ICTY was established under 
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Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a measure to bring to justice those responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law in the region and in turn, 
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the region. Chapter VII 
authorizes the UNSC to take action “with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace, and acts of aggression.”242 It provides the UNSC with the power to 
determine the existence of any threat to “international peace and security” and to take 
military or non-military actions necessary to restore it.243  
According to Kerr and Mobekk, “the [ICTY’s] mode of establishment under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a measure for international peace and security was 
truly innovative and had a number of implications for its mandate and operation.”244 
This “interpretation of the [UNSC’s] powers and responsibilities” marked an 
important shift in the perceived link between peace and justice as “mutually 
reinforcing objectives.”245 The ICTY was established as a temporary institution to 
prosecute war criminals and thus restore and maintain peace in a region still 
characterized by conflict. It was established for this specific purpose at a time when 
national jurisdictions were not willing or able to do so. This mode of establishment 
may explain why the ICTY has assumed a direct role in the process of peacebuilding 
in the region of the former Yugoslavia. In order to conclude its mission successfully, 
in a timely way, the Tribunal was compelled to conduct public outreach and 
strengthen the competency of national judicial systems in the former Yugoslavia.  
A second possible explanation for the ICTY’s role in the peacebuilding 
process in the Balkans is the Tribunal’s geographical location. The fact that the ICTY 
was set up outside the region for which it distributed justice posed problems for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 UN Charter Art 39.   
243 Ibid. 
244 Kerr and Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability After War, 31. 
245 Ibid., 32. 
	  	  
LaVilla 68 
knowledge and awareness of Tribunal’s purpose and work. Unlike the Nuremberg 
tribunal, which was established in Nuremberg, Germany, the ICTY was established in 
The Hague, 2,000 km away from the region for which it dispensed justice. The 
decision to locate the Tribunal in The Hague was based on the notion that “by acting 
outside the cauldron of domestic politics, the tribunals' international judges and 
prosecutors would [be able to] uphold the law and not fall victim to the political 
forces that have characteristically undermined the legitimacy of domestic war crimes 
trials in deeply divided societies.”246 It was believed that the “independence and 
insulation from external pressure” would enable to the Tribunal to “deliver justice 
fairly and impartially.”247 
However, the location of the Tribunal proved to be problematic in fulfilling its 
mandate.248 Since its initiation, knowledge about the ICTY, as an international court 
of law, has not been pervasive. During the immediate post-war period, the goal of the 
Tribunal to deter impunity and face the past in the Balkans was gravely inhibited by 
the lack of knowledge of the court in the region.249 Specifically, in 1995, the genocide 
at Srebrenica demonstrated the lack of the tribunal’s progress to prevent further 
crimes.250 It became clear that the ICTY would only achieve its desired impact if it 
made an effort to inform the population of the former Yugoslavia about its purpose 
and work.251  
Outreach provides a formal program by which international and local actors 
can manage expectations of international justice and increase familiarity of facts 	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about the war established in the courts. According to Nettelfield “courts’ expressivist 
impact will always be limited if individuals do not know how they work.”252 
Although the location of the Tribunal may have removed it from the influence of 
political forces in the region, it may also explain the misperceptions and mistrust of 
local populations in the region. Thus, the location of the ICTY may have undermined 
the legitimacy of its proceedings. Because the court, and its proceedings and verdicts, 
were removed from the everyday lives of the people in the region, it was easier for the 
public to critique the verdicts being handed down by distant foreigners as biased. 
Specifically, that the ICTY is anti-Serbian.253 In this regard, the decision to locate the 
ICTY in The Hague may have increased the functional need to adopt a public 
outreach strategy to overcome these negative perceptions and attitudes towards the 
Tribunal.  
Finally, developments in norms of international judicial intervention following 
the Cold War may be responsible for the emergence of this new role of international 
tribunals. International tribunals can play a crucial role in peacebuilding when 
domestic authorities are unwilling and/or unable to investigate and prosecute war 
crimes cases. 254  With the understanding that justice, peace and democracy are 
mutually reinforcing imperatives, the UN Secretary General contended that although 
“restoring the capacity and legitimacy of national institutions is a long-term 
undertaking…urgent action to restore human security, human rights and the rule of 
law cannot be deferred. Thus, United Nations peace operations are often called upon 
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to help fill this rule of law vacuum.”255 According to McAuliffe, “implementing 
processes of accountability in the aftermath of war will often serve as an impetus for 
rebuilding the judiciary, and vice versa.”256 The notion that peace and justice are 
reinforcing in this way may be responsible for changing the character of international 
justice and transforming the role of international tribunals in post-conflict societies. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the change in the role of 
international tribunals. This brief examination of some of the possible causes 
illustrates the ways in which the circumstances surrounding an international tribunal’s 
establishment, its legal basis, political aims, criminal and territorial jurisdiction, and 
relationship with the region for which it distributes justice are linked. 
Implications and Conclusion 
The purpose of this study has been to better understand the ICTY’s role and 
activities, in part by comparing them to the roles and activities of the Nuremberg 
tribunal. Perhaps the most important distinction is the legacy of each of these bodies. 
Since July 1, 2013, jurisdiction over ICTY cases has been transferred to the MICT. 
This transition calls attention to what the Tribunal’s role has been in transitional 
justice processes in the former Yugoslavia. Evaluation of the Tribunal’s work 
identifies one of its key contributions to reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts in 
BiH as the development of the WCC in the State Court of BiH, as well as the 
strengthening of national judiciaries in the region. As an international tribunal, the 
ICTY was established to prosecute those individuals responsible for violations of 
international humanitarian law. As its work evolved it also assumed the responsibility 
of building the capacity of national judiciaries in the former Yugoslavia and 
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outreaching the findings of the Tribunal to both the international community and local 
communities in the region of the former Yugoslavia. 
At the ICTY Global Legacy Conference held in Sarajevo, BiH in November 
2012 representatives from the ICTY, the broader international community, and 
officials from national judiciaries, experts on transitional justice issues, lawyers, 
victims, journalist, politicians, representatives from leading NGOS, and other local 
stakeholders gathered to discuss the ICTY’s role and accomplishments in BIH and the 
greater Balkan region. During the conference, participants engaged in constructive 
dialogue about the scope of the Tribunal’s legacy, its role in transitional justice 
processes, and local priorities for the future. The legacy of the ICTY, or “that which 
the Tribunal will hand down to its successors and others” includes the factual 
findings, judgments and decisions of the court; the Tribunal’s rules of procedure and 
evidence and best practices; the records of the Tribunal; its institutional legacy in 
developing local judiciaries and establishing a precedent for the creation of other 
international and hybrid criminal courts; its regional legacy in promoting the rule of 
law and supporting domestic judicial capacity in the region; and the MICT through 
which the Tribunal’s work will be continued and preserved.257 
The ICTY’s contribution to the rule of law and peace and reconciliation in the 
region is indisputably immense. It spans from the war crimes trials to the 
establishment of new courts in the region. According to Judge Hilmo Vucinic, Court 
of BiH, the importance of the legacy of the ICTY is “huge for the jurisdiction of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”258 He asserted that: 
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The increase in efficiency is immense if we take into account that from 2005, 
when the War Crimes Department was established, until September 2012, 
ninety cases of war crimes were finalized involving 122 accused, while, 
before the ICTY 126 persons were accused, and the ICTY needed the period 
from 1993 until 2012 to complete the trials in these cases.259 
Vucinic explained: 
The Law on Transfer of Cases from the ICTY to the Prosecutor’s Office of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Use of Evidence Collected by the ICTY in 
Proceedings before the Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina…[are] a novelty in 
criminal legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina…[it] is a decisive contribution 
to the processing of war crimes before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and enables us to use all evidence obtained by the ICTY.260 
In conjunction with the research and interviews conducted for this project, the 
conference proceedings clearly illustrate how the Tribunal’s engagement in extensive 
trainings and administration of substantial assistance to national courts has redefined 
its role in the region. In this way, it has raised the question of the future role and 
responsibility of international tribunals in the peacebuilding process in post-conflict 
societies. 
As the first international tribunal to be established since the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals, as well as the first international court established by the UN, the 
ICTY provides a model for the development of future international judicial 
mechanisms. Since the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC along with a 
number of special ‘hybrid,’ ‘mixed’ and ‘internationalized’ courts and tribunals have 
been established, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in 2002, the 	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Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in 2003, and the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon in 2009, in which international and domestic law, procedure and 
personnel are mixed.261 First and foremost, the shortcomings of the ICTY reinforced 
calls for the creation of the ICC, the first permanent and treaty based international 
criminal court.262 Furthermore, the ICTY has illustrated the incredible contribution 
that transitional justice mechanisms can make to strengthening domestic judicial 
capacity and helping fill the rule of law vacuum in post-conflict societies. These new 
hybrid, mixed, and internationalized courts and tribunals occupy a “middle ground 
between the purely international model adopted by the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC and the 
purely domestic courts.”263 In light of the challenges faced by the ICTY, these special 
criminal tribunals have “sought to advance a number of [the Tribunal’s principal] 
objectives” including re-establishing the rule of law and contributing to the 
restoration of peace in post-conflict societies. The shortcomings of the ICTY 
reinforced the need to adopt integrated and complimentary approaches to dispensing 
justice in the aftermath of conflict. In this regard, these special courts and tribunals 
aim to further contribute to building local capacity in a weak or failing domestic 
judicial system.264 According to the Secretary-General: 
There a number of important benefits to locating tribunals inside the countries 
concerned, including easier interaction with local population, closer proximity 
to the evidence and witnesses and being more accessible to victims…National 
location also enhances the national capacity-building contribution…allowing 
them to bequeath their physical infrastructure (including buildings, equipment 
and furniture) to national justice systems, and to build the skills of national 	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justice personnel. In the nationally located tribunals, international personnel 
work side by side with their national counterparts and on-the-job training can 
be provided to national lawyers, officials and staff.265  
Public outreach strategies have also been adopted by many of the ICTY’s successors, 
including the ICC, in light of the challenges faced by the ICTY. Effective 
communication and outreach have been recognized as crucial elements in the success 
of transitional justice. The failures of the ICTY, in engaging with the local 
community at an early stage, led these new international justice mechanisms to 
initially adopt strategies to ensure that affected communities are informed, updated, 
and engaged in the investigations and proceedings.266  
Taken together, the findings of this study provide important insight into how 
the notions of accountability, rule of law, and peace and justice have evolved over 
time. Despite the criticism of the ICTY, the absence of such an organization would 
have caused BiH, as well as other regions of the former Yugoslavia, to significantly 
lag behind in their quest for democracy and reconciliation. This thesis illustrates that 
it is no longer enough for ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY to merely exist and fulfill 
their basic mandates. The real success of international justice relies on these 
institutions’ ability to transfer responsibility from the international community to the 
local community and establish domestic judiciaries that can carry on their missions 
and make them domestic initiatives. Just as the ICTY was predicated on Nuremberg’s 
legacy, the establishment of future international judicial mechanisms will likely 
continue to be influenced by the ICTY’s experience. Therefore, understanding how 
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the ICTY is both similar and different from the Nuremberg tribunal provides 
important insight into how the role of international tribunals will continue to change. 
As the 20th anniversary of the ICTY’s establishment approached, Judge 
Carmel Agius, Vice President of the ICTY, urged participants of the ICTY Global 
Legacy Conference, held in Sarajevo, BiH in 2012, to remember the legacy of the 
Nuremberg trials. Recalling the ICTY’s rocky start, and doubts surrounding the 
Tribunal’s capability to “conduct a proper investigation, let alone hold a trial,” Judge 
Agius called attention to the legacy the ICTY has built over the course of its mandate. 
He asserted that, having indicted and accounted for 161 individuals accused of war 
crimes in the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY “is a leader in the global fight for 
justice.”267 
So—the question remains, what is the ICTY leaving behind? When will the 
Tribunal’s legacy be fulfilled? According to Judge Agius: 
The legacy of the ICTY, the facts it established, its archives, and its 
contribution to the rule of law in the region will certainly prove to be a 
decisive facilitator in the process of facing the past and securing reconciliation 
in not only Bosnia and Herzegovina but also the entire region. The Tribunal’s 
legacy will be fulfilled when it inspires this and future generations to 
transform Bosnia and Herzegovina through the rule of law, accountability, and 
equal justice.268 
The ICTY has demonstrated the role the international community can play in 
preventing a return to conflict in the future. By addressing the causes of conflict, in a 
legitimate and fair manner, the ICTY was able to strengthen the rule of law in the 
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region of the former Yugoslavia in the wake of conflict. The role of international 
tribunals should extend well beyond the courtroom. The unprecedented role assumed 
by the ICTY, to help rebuild the rule of law in the region of the former Yugoslavia 
was crucial to fulfilling its mandate. In comparison to the Nuremberg tribunal, as well 
as in its own right, there are a number of lessons to be learned from the ICTY. 
International tribunals face a host of constraints. In transitional contexts, limits are 
placed on the reach of criminal justice. Moreover, funding, resources, caseload, and 
time constraints make balancing and achieving primary objectives complex. For this 
reason, it is pivotal that international war crimes tribunals consider their exit strategy 
and legacy at the time of establishment. 
The conclusion of the ICTY legacy conference offers a good summary of the 
important themes that arose in the conference, as well as my interviews. After the 
final panel, the difficulty in drawing conclusions from open debate was noted. The 
Director of Communication at the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) 
noted that the people of BiH are “still fighting against each other with [their] versions 
of truth.”269 Now, the legacy of the ICTY is offering the community of BiH a “unique 
opportunity” to make use of their findings to advance the work of domestic courts and 
encourage the organic growth of reconciliation in the region. 270 One of the closing 
speakers at the conference noted that human rights violations do not happen in the 
abstract—justice must be made to address people in their daily lives. Therefore, when 
we look to the future, it is important to look towards the new generation and 
recognize the importance of bolstering national judicial capacity and conducting 
outreach in the public sphere. 
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Ultimately, the extent to which international institutions facilitate societal 
reconciliation is, and will be, understood within the context of the legacies they leave 
behind. What we can learn from the incorporation of assessing issues of impact in the 
completion strategies of ad hoc tribunals is that prior to their establishment, there is a 
need to examine and clearly define their desired goals and objectives for post-conflict 
societies. This study shows that in the future, institutions such as the ICTY will not be 
judged solely on the merit of the ideals that they were established on, but instead on 
their concrete successes in the domestic arena and their ability to fortify domestic 
judicial capacity. It is only with meaningful support of domestic reform 
constituencies, specifically, domestic rule of law capacity building within the justice 
sector, that international judicial intervention will have the greatest hope for 
maintaining and restoring peace in post-conflict societies. 
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